Remove report

REPORT.md

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-# Security Analysis Report
-
-Date: 2026-03-02
-Repository: /Users/bedas/Developer/GitHub/dcm
-Scope: backend FastAPI API and worker, frontend React app, Docker runtime configuration, and local `.env` posture.
-
-## Executive Verdict
-
-Current state is **not production ready**.
-
-- Blocking code-level issues exist and should be fixed before production exposure.
-- Additional user-dependent deployment risks are present in `.env` and runtime defaults. Per request, these are listed as MUST KNOW and not marked as blocking.
-
-## Method and Coverage
-
-Performed a read-only static review of:
-
-- API auth, authorization, upload and file handling, routing, settings, and worker pipelines.
-- Frontend auth token handling and preview rendering behavior.
-- Docker and environment defaults affecting network and secret posture.
-- Existing security-focused tests and basic frontend API tests.
-
-## Blocking Security Issues (Code-Level)
-
-### 3) Medium - Token persistence risk in browser storage (Remediated)
-
-Impact:
-
-- Previously, a bearer token in browser sessionStorage could be stolen by a successful XSS in the frontend origin.
-- The codebase now uses HttpOnly session cookies plus CSRF protection, so tokens are no longer kept in browser storage.
-
-Exploit path:
-
-- Previously: malicious script execution on app origin read `sessionStorage` and exfiltrated `Authorization` token.
-
-Evidence:
-
-- Previous evidence in this scan no longer applies after implementation of cookie-backed auth in:
-  - `frontend/src/lib/api.ts`
-  - `backend/app/api/auth.py`
-  - `backend/app/api/routes_auth.py`
-  - `backend/app/main.py`
-
-Remediation:
-
-- Implemented: HttpOnly Secure SameSite session cookies and CSRF protection with frontend CSRF header propagation for state-changing requests.
-- If bearer-in-JS remains, enforce strict CSP, remove inline script execution, and add strong dependency hygiene.