From 4b34d6153c2eaa4c7e2f4cba9475b26bcdcf1c3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Beda Schmid Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2026 21:55:53 -0300 Subject: [PATCH] Remove report --- REPORT.md | 47 ----------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 47 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 REPORT.md diff --git a/REPORT.md b/REPORT.md deleted file mode 100644 index ca4a5ad..0000000 --- a/REPORT.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -# Security Analysis Report - -Date: 2026-03-02 -Repository: /Users/bedas/Developer/GitHub/dcm -Scope: backend FastAPI API and worker, frontend React app, Docker runtime configuration, and local `.env` posture. - -## Executive Verdict - -Current state is **not production ready**. - -- Blocking code-level issues exist and should be fixed before production exposure. -- Additional user-dependent deployment risks are present in `.env` and runtime defaults. Per request, these are listed as MUST KNOW and not marked as blocking. - -## Method and Coverage - -Performed a read-only static review of: - -- API auth, authorization, upload and file handling, routing, settings, and worker pipelines. -- Frontend auth token handling and preview rendering behavior. -- Docker and environment defaults affecting network and secret posture. -- Existing security-focused tests and basic frontend API tests. - -## Blocking Security Issues (Code-Level) - -### 3) Medium - Token persistence risk in browser storage (Remediated) - -Impact: - -- Previously, a bearer token in browser sessionStorage could be stolen by a successful XSS in the frontend origin. -- The codebase now uses HttpOnly session cookies plus CSRF protection, so tokens are no longer kept in browser storage. - -Exploit path: - -- Previously: malicious script execution on app origin read `sessionStorage` and exfiltrated `Authorization` token. - -Evidence: - -- Previous evidence in this scan no longer applies after implementation of cookie-backed auth in: - - `frontend/src/lib/api.ts` - - `backend/app/api/auth.py` - - `backend/app/api/routes_auth.py` - - `backend/app/main.py` - -Remediation: - -- Implemented: HttpOnly Secure SameSite session cookies and CSRF protection with frontend CSRF header propagation for state-changing requests. -- If bearer-in-JS remains, enforce strict CSP, remove inline script execution, and add strong dependency hygiene.