Try a unified api endpoint

This reverts commit daa11cb768.

.env.example

@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 # Development defaults (HTTP local stack)
 APP_ENV=development
 HOST_BIND_IP=127.0.0.1
+# Optional host directory for persistent bind mounts in docker-compose.yml.
+# Defaults to ./data when unset.
+# DCM_DATA_DIR=./data
 
 POSTGRES_USER=dcm
 POSTGRES_PASSWORD=ChangeMe-Postgres-Secret
@@ -23,6 +26,11 @@ AUTH_LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT=5
 AUTH_LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW_SECONDS=900
 AUTH_LOGIN_LOCKOUT_BASE_SECONDS=30
 AUTH_LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MAX_SECONDS=900
+# Optional cookie controls for split frontend/api hosts:
+# Leave AUTH_COOKIE_DOMAIN empty unless you explicitly need a parent-domain CSRF cookie mirror.
+# Host-only auth cookies are issued automatically for the API host.
+# AUTH_COOKIE_DOMAIN=docs.lan
+# AUTH_COOKIE_SAMESITE=auto
 
 APP_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=ChangeMe-Settings-Encryption-Key
 TYPESENSE_API_KEY=ChangeMe-Typesense-Key
@@ -39,7 +47,13 @@ PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOWLIST=[]
 
 PUBLIC_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8000
 CORS_ORIGINS=["http://localhost:5173","http://localhost:3000"]
+# Leave empty to use same-origin /api/v1 through the frontend proxy.
+# Set an absolute URL only when you intentionally want split-origin frontend/API traffic.
 VITE_API_BASE=
+# Development-only Vite proxy target. Docker compose sets this to http://api:8000 automatically.
+VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET=http://localhost:8000
+# Development-only Vite host allowlist override.
+VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS=
 
 # Production baseline overrides (set explicitly for live deployments):
 # APP_ENV=production
@@ -47,9 +61,12 @@ VITE_API_BASE=
 # REDIS_URL=rediss://:<strong-password>@redis.example.internal:6379/0
 # REDIS_SECURITY_MODE=strict
 # REDIS_TLS_MODE=required
+# AUTH_COOKIE_DOMAIN=example.com
+# AUTH_COOKIE_SAMESITE=none
 # PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_HTTP=false
 # PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=false
 # PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOWLIST=["api.openai.com"]
 # PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://api.example.com
 # CORS_ORIGINS=["https://app.example.com"]
 # VITE_API_BASE=https://api.example.com/api/v1
+# VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS=app.example.com

.gitignore

@@ -20,9 +20,8 @@ build/
 !.env.example
 
 # Data and generated artifacts (runtime only)
-data/postgres/
-data/redis/
-data/storage/
+data/
+typesense-data/
 
 # OS / IDE
 .DS_Store

AGENTS.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 ## Stack Snapshot
 - DMS monorepo with FastAPI API + RQ worker (`backend/`) and React + Vite + TypeScript frontend (`frontend/`).
 - Services in `docker-compose.yml`: `api`, `worker`, `frontend`, `db` (Postgres), `redis`, `typesense`.
-- Runtime persistence uses Docker named volumes (`db-data`, `redis-data`, `dcm-storage`, `typesense-data`).
+- Runtime persistence uses host bind mounts under `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}` (`db-data`, `redis-data`, `storage`, `typesense-data`).
 
 ## Project Layout
 - Backend app code: `backend/app/` (`api/`, `services/`, `db/`, `models/`, `schemas/`, `worker/`).

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -3,18 +3,5 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
 
-## [Unreleased]
-
 ### Added
-- Initialized `CHANGELOG.md` with Keep a Changelog structure for ongoing release-note tracking.
-
-### Changed
-- Refreshed `README.md` with current stack details, runtime services, setup commands, configuration notes, and manual validation guidance.
-
-### Deprecated
-
-### Removed
-
-### Fixed
-
-### Security
+- Initial release

README.md

@@ -1,146 +1,91 @@
 # LedgerDock
 
-LedgerDock is a self-hosted document management system (DMS) for ingesting, processing, organizing, and searching files.
+LedgerDock is a private document workspace you can run on your own computer or server.
+It helps teams collect files, process text from documents, and find information quickly with search.
 
-## Core Capabilities
+## What LedgerDock Is For
 
-- Drag and drop upload from anywhere in the UI
-- File and folder upload with path preservation
-- Asynchronous extraction and OCR for PDF, images, DOCX, XLSX, TXT, and ZIP
-- Metadata and full-text search
-- Routing suggestions based on previous decisions
-- Original file download and extracted markdown export
+- Upload files and folders from one place
+- Keep documents organized and searchable
+- Extract text from scans and images (OCR)
+- Download originals or extracted text
 
-## Technology Stack
+## Before You Start
 
-- Backend: FastAPI, SQLAlchemy, RQ worker (`backend/`)
-- Frontend: React, Vite, TypeScript (`frontend/`)
-- Infrastructure: PostgreSQL, Redis, Typesense (`docker-compose.yml`)
+You need:
 
-## Runtime Services
+- Docker Desktop (Windows or macOS) or Docker Engine + Docker Compose (Linux)
+- A terminal app
+- The project folder on your machine
+- Internet access the first time you build containers
 
-The default `docker compose` stack includes:
+## Install With Docker Compose
 
-- `frontend` - React UI (`http://localhost:5173`)
-- `api` - FastAPI backend (`http://localhost:8000`, docs at `/docs`)
-- `worker` - background processing jobs
-- `db` - PostgreSQL (internal service network)
-- `redis` - queue backend (internal service network)
-- `typesense` - search index (internal service network)
+Follow these steps from the project folder (where `docker-compose.yml` is located).
 
-## Requirements
+1. Create your local settings file from the template.
 
-- Docker Engine
-- Docker Compose plugin
-- Internet access for first-time image build
+```bash
+cp .env.example .env
+```
 
-## Quick Start
-
-From repository root:
+2. Open `.env` in a text editor and set your own passwords and keys.
+3. Start LedgerDock.
 
 ```bash
 docker compose up --build -d
 ```
 
-Before first run, set required secrets and connection values in `.env` (or your shell):
+4. Wait until startup is complete, then open the app:
+- LedgerDock web app: `http://localhost:5173`
+- Health check: `http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health`
+5. Sign in with the admin username and password you set in `.env`.
 
-- `POSTGRES_USER`
-- `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`
-- `POSTGRES_DB`
-- `DATABASE_URL`
-- `REDIS_PASSWORD`
-- `REDIS_URL`
-- `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME`
-- `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD`
-- optional `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER_USERNAME`
-- optional `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER_PASSWORD`
-- `APP_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
-- `TYPESENSE_API_KEY`
+## `.env` Settings Explained In Plain Language
 
-Start from `.env.example` to avoid missing required variables.
+LedgerDock reads settings from `.env`. Some values are required and some are optional.
 
-Open:
+### Required: Change These Before First Use
 
-- Frontend: `http://localhost:5173`
-- API docs: `http://localhost:8000/docs`
-- Health: `http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health`
+- `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`: Password for the internal database.
+- `REDIS_PASSWORD`: Password for the internal queue service.
+- `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD`: First admin login password.
+- `APP_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`: Secret used to protect saved app settings.
+- `TYPESENSE_API_KEY`: Secret key for the search engine.
 
-Use bootstrap credentials (`AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME` and `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD`) to sign in from the frontend login screen.
+Use long, unique values for each one. Do not reuse personal passwords.
 
-Stop the stack:
+### Required: Usually Keep Defaults Unless You Know You Need Changes
 
-```bash
-docker compose down
-```
+- `POSTGRES_USER`: Database username.
+- `POSTGRES_DB`: Database name.
+- `DATABASE_URL`: Connection string to the database service.
+- `REDIS_URL`: Connection string to the Redis service.
+- `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME`: First admin username (default `admin`).
 
-## Security Must-Know Before Real User Deployment
+If you change passwords, make sure matching URLs use the same new password.
 
-The items below port the `MUST KNOW User-Dependent Risks` from `REPORT.md` into explicit operator actions.
+### Optional User Account (Can Be Left Empty)
 
-### High: Development-first defaults can be promoted to production
+- `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER_USERNAME`
+- `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_USER_PASSWORD`
 
-Avoid:
-- Set `APP_ENV=production`.
-- Set `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_HTTP=false`.
-- Set `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=false`.
-- Set a strict non-empty `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOWLIST` for approved provider hosts only.
-- Set `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` to HTTPS.
-- Restrict `CORS_ORIGINS` to exact production frontend origins.
-- Use `REDIS_URL` with `rediss://`.
-- Set `REDIS_SECURITY_MODE=strict`.
-- Set `REDIS_TLS_MODE=required`.
-- Keep `HOST_BIND_IP=127.0.0.1` and expose services only through an HTTPS reverse proxy.
+These create an extra non-admin account on first startup.
 
-Remedy:
-- Immediately correct the values above and redeploy `api` and `worker` (`docker compose up -d api worker`).
-- Rotate `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_*` credentials, provider API keys, and Redis credentials if insecure values were used in a reachable environment.
-- Re-check `.env.example` and `docker-compose.yml` before each production promotion.
+### Network and Access Settings
 
-### Medium: Login throttle IP identity depends on proxy trust model
+- `HOST_BIND_IP`: Where services listen. Keep `127.0.0.1` for local-only access.
+- `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`: Backend base URL. Local default is `http://localhost:8000`.
+- `CORS_ORIGINS`: Allowed frontend origins. Keep local defaults for single-machine use.
+- `VITE_API_BASE`: Frontend API URL override. Leave empty unless you know you need it.
 
-Current behavior:
-- Login throttle identity currently uses `request.client.host` directly.
+### Environment Mode
 
-Avoid:
-- Deploy so the backend receives true client IP addresses and does not collapse all traffic to one proxy source IP.
-- Validate lockout behavior with multiple client IPs before going live behind a proxy.
+- `APP_ENV=development`: Local mode (default).
+- `APP_ENV=production`: Use when running as a real shared deployment with HTTPS and tighter security settings.
+  - Frontend runtime switches to a static build served by Nginx in this mode.
 
-Remedy:
-- If lockouts affect many users at once, temporarily increase `AUTH_LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT` and tune lockout timings to reduce impact while mitigation is in progress.
-- Update network and proxy topology so client IP identity is preserved for the backend, then re-run lockout validation tests.
-
-### Medium: API documentation endpoints are exposed by default
-
-Avoid:
-- Block public access to `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` at the reverse proxy or edge firewall.
-- Keep docs endpoints reachable only from trusted internal/admin networks.
-
-Remedy:
-- Add deny rules for those paths immediately and reload the proxy.
-- Verify those routes return `403` or `404` from untrusted networks.
-
-### Medium: Auth session tokens are cookie-based
-
-Avoid:
-- Keep dependencies patched to reduce known XSS vectors.
-- Keep frontend dependencies locked and scanned for known payload paths.
-- Treat any suspected script injection as a session risk and rotate bootstrap credentials immediately.
-
-Remedy:
-- If script injection is suspected, revoke active sessions, rotate bootstrap credentials, and redeploy frontend fixes before restoring access.
-- Treat exposed sessions as compromised until revocation and credential rotation are complete.
-- Cookies are HttpOnly and cannot be read by JavaScript, but session scope still ends on server-side revocation and expiry controls.
-
-### Low: Typesense transport defaults to HTTP on internal network
-
-Avoid:
-- Keep Typesense on isolated internal networks only.
-- Do not expose Typesense service ports directly to untrusted networks.
-
-Remedy:
-- For cross-host or untrusted network paths, terminate TLS in front of Typesense (or use equivalent secure service networking) and require encrypted transport for all clients.
-
-## Common Operations
+## Daily Use Commands
 
 Start or rebuild:
 
@@ -154,97 +99,50 @@ Stop:
 docker compose down
 ```
 
-Tail logs:
+View logs:
 
 ```bash
 docker compose logs -f
 ```
 
-Tail API and worker logs only:
+View backend logs only:
 
 ```bash
 docker compose logs -f api worker
 ```
 
-Reset all runtime data (destructive):
+## Where Your Data Is Stored
+
+LedgerDock stores persistent runtime data in host bind mounts. By default the host root is `./data`, or set `DCM_DATA_DIR` to move it:
+
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/db-data` for PostgreSQL data
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/redis-data` for Redis data
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage` for uploaded files and app storage
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/typesense-data` for the search index
+
+On startup, Compose runs a one-shot `storage-init` service that creates the storage tree and applies write access for the backend runtime user `uid=10001`. If you want to inspect or repair it manually, use:
 
 ```bash
-docker compose down -v
+mkdir -p ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage
+sudo chown -R 10001:10001 ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage
+sudo chmod -R u+rwX,g+rwX ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage
 ```
 
-## Frontend-Only Local Workflow
-
-If backend services are already running, you can run frontend tooling locally:
+To remove everything, including data:
 
 ```bash
-cd frontend && npm run dev
-cd frontend && npm run build
-cd frontend && npm run preview
+docker compose down
+rm -rf ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}
 ```
 
-`npm run preview` serves the built app on port `4173`.
+Warning: this permanently deletes your LedgerDock data on this machine.
 
-## Configuration
+## First Checks After Install
 
-Main runtime variables are defined in `docker-compose.yml`:
+- Open `http://localhost:5173` and confirm the login page appears.
+- Open `http://localhost:8000/api/v1/health` and confirm you get `{"status":"ok"}`.
+- Upload one sample file and confirm it appears in search.
 
-- API and worker: `DATABASE_URL`, `REDIS_URL`, `REDIS_SECURITY_MODE`, `REDIS_TLS_MODE`, `STORAGE_ROOT`, `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`, `CORS_ORIGINS`, `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_*`, `PROCESSING_LOG_STORE_*`, `CONTENT_EXPORT_*`, `TYPESENSE_*`, `APP_SETTINGS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
-- Frontend: optional `VITE_API_BASE`
+## Need Technical Documentation?
 
-When `VITE_API_BASE` is unset, the frontend uses `http://<current-hostname>:8000/api/v1`.
-
-Application settings saved from the UI persist at:
-
-- `<STORAGE_ROOT>/settings.json` (inside the storage volume)
-
-Provider API keys are persisted encrypted at rest (`api_key_encrypted`) and are no longer written as plaintext values.
-
-Settings endpoints:
-
-- `GET/PATCH /api/v1/settings`
-- `POST /api/v1/settings/reset`
-- `PATCH /api/v1/settings/handwriting`
-- `POST /api/v1/processing/logs/trim` (admin only)
-
-Auth endpoints:
-
-- `POST /api/v1/auth/login`
-- `GET /api/v1/auth/me`
-- `POST /api/v1/auth/logout`
-
-Detailed DEV and LIVE environment guidance, including HTTPS reverse-proxy deployment values, is documented in `doc/operations-and-configuration.md` and `.env.example`.
-
-## Data Persistence
-
-Docker named volumes used by the stack:
-
-- `db-data`
-- `redis-data`
-- `dcm-storage`
-- `typesense-data`
-
-## Validation Checklist
-
-After setup or config changes, verify:
-
-- `GET /api/v1/health` returns `{"status":"ok"}`
-- Upload and processing complete successfully
-- Search returns expected results
-- Preview and download work for uploaded documents
-- `docker compose logs -f api worker` has no failures
-
-## Repository Layout
-
-- `backend/` - FastAPI API, services, models, worker
-- `frontend/` - React application
-- `doc/` - technical documentation for architecture, API, data model, and operations
-- `docker-compose.yml` - local runtime topology
-
-## Documentation Index
-
-- `doc/README.md` - technical documentation entrypoint
-- `doc/architecture-overview.md` - service and runtime architecture
-- `doc/api-contract.md` - endpoint and payload contract
-- `doc/data-model-reference.md` - persistence model reference
-- `doc/operations-and-configuration.md` - runtime operations and configuration
-- `doc/frontend-design-foundation.md` - frontend design rules
+Developer and operator docs are in `doc/`, starting at `doc/README.md`.

backend/app/api/auth.py

@@ -54,6 +54,28 @@ def _requires_csrf_validation(method: str) -> bool:
     return method.upper() in CSRF_PROTECTED_METHODS
 
 
+def _extract_cookie_values(request: Request, cookie_name: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Extracts all values for one cookie name from raw Cookie header order."""
+
+    request_headers = getattr(request, "headers", None)
+    raw_cookie_header = request_headers.get("cookie", "") if request_headers is not None else ""
+    if not raw_cookie_header:
+        return ()
+
+    extracted_values: list[str] = []
+    for cookie_pair in raw_cookie_header.split(";"):
+        normalized_pair = cookie_pair.strip()
+        if not normalized_pair or "=" not in normalized_pair:
+            continue
+        key, value = normalized_pair.split("=", 1)
+        if key.strip() != cookie_name:
+            continue
+        normalized_value = value.strip()
+        if normalized_value:
+            extracted_values.append(normalized_value)
+    return tuple(extracted_values)
+
+
 def _raise_unauthorized() -> None:
     """Raises a 401 challenge response for missing or invalid auth sessions."""
 
@@ -85,24 +107,39 @@ def get_request_auth_context(
 
     token = credentials.credentials.strip() if credentials is not None and credentials.credentials else ""
     using_cookie_session = False
+    session_candidates: list[str] = []
 
     if not token:
-        token = (session_cookie or "").strip()
         using_cookie_session = True
-    if not token:
+        session_candidates = [candidate for candidate in _extract_cookie_values(request, SESSION_COOKIE_NAME) if candidate]
+        normalized_session_cookie = (session_cookie or "").strip()
+        if normalized_session_cookie and normalized_session_cookie not in session_candidates:
+            session_candidates.append(normalized_session_cookie)
+        if not session_candidates:
             _raise_unauthorized()
 
     if _requires_csrf_validation(request.method) and using_cookie_session:
         normalized_csrf_header = (csrf_header or "").strip()
+        csrf_candidates = [candidate for candidate in _extract_cookie_values(request, CSRF_COOKIE_NAME) if candidate]
         normalized_csrf_cookie = (csrf_cookie or "").strip()
+        if normalized_csrf_cookie and normalized_csrf_cookie not in csrf_candidates:
+            csrf_candidates.append(normalized_csrf_cookie)
         if (
-            not normalized_csrf_cookie
+            not csrf_candidates
             or not normalized_csrf_header
-            or not hmac.compare_digest(normalized_csrf_cookie, normalized_csrf_header)
+            or not any(hmac.compare_digest(candidate, normalized_csrf_header) for candidate in csrf_candidates)
         ):
             _raise_csrf_rejected()
 
+    resolved_session = None
+    if token:
         resolved_session = resolve_auth_session(session, token=token)
+    else:
+        for candidate in session_candidates:
+            resolved_session = resolve_auth_session(session, token=candidate)
+            if resolved_session is not None and resolved_session.user is not None:
+                break
+
     if resolved_session is None or resolved_session.user is None:
         _raise_unauthorized()
 

backend/app/api/routes_auth.py

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 import logging
 import secrets
 from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ from app.api.auth import (
     CSRF_COOKIE_NAME,
     require_user_or_admin,
 )
+from app.core.config import get_settings
 from app.db.base import get_session
 from app.schemas.auth import (
     AuthLoginRequest,
@@ -28,9 +30,14 @@ from app.services.auth_login_throttle import (
 )
 
 try:
-    from fastapi import Response
+    from fastapi import Cookie, Response
 except (ImportError, AttributeError):
     from fastapi.responses import Response
+
+    def Cookie(_default=None, **_kwargs):  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
+        """Compatibility fallback for environments that stub fastapi without request params."""
+
+        return None
 from app.services.authentication import authenticate_user, issue_user_session, revoke_auth_session
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["auth"])
@@ -66,9 +73,67 @@ def _is_https_request(request: Request) -> bool:
     if forwarded_protocol:
         return forwarded_protocol == "https"
     request_url = getattr(request, "url", None)
-    if request_url is None:
+    request_scheme = str(getattr(request_url, "scheme", "")).lower() if request_url is not None else ""
+    if request_scheme == "https":
+        return True
+
+    parsed_public_base_url = urlparse(get_settings().public_base_url.strip())
+    return parsed_public_base_url.scheme.lower() == "https"
+
+
+def _resolve_cookie_domain() -> str | None:
+    """Returns optional cookie domain override for multi-subdomain deployments."""
+
+    configured_domain = get_settings().auth_cookie_domain.strip().lower().lstrip(".")
+    if not configured_domain or "." not in configured_domain:
+        return None
+    return configured_domain
+
+
+def _resolve_cookie_domains() -> tuple[str | None, ...]:
+    """Returns cookie domain variants with a host-only cookie first for browser compatibility."""
+
+    configured_domain = _resolve_cookie_domain()
+    if configured_domain is None:
+        return (None,)
+    return (None, configured_domain)
+
+
+def _request_matches_cookie_domain(request: Request) -> bool:
+    """Returns whether request and origin hosts both sit under the configured cookie domain."""
+
+    configured_domain = _resolve_cookie_domain()
+    if configured_domain is None:
         return False
-    return str(getattr(request_url, "scheme", "")).lower() == "https"
+
+    origin_header = request.headers.get("origin", "").strip()
+    origin_host = urlparse(origin_header).hostname.strip().lower() if origin_header else ""
+    if not origin_host:
+        return False
+
+    request_url = getattr(request, "url", None)
+    request_host = str(getattr(request_url, "hostname", "")).strip().lower() if request_url is not None else ""
+    if not request_host:
+        parsed_public_base_url = urlparse(get_settings().public_base_url.strip())
+        request_host = parsed_public_base_url.hostname.strip().lower() if parsed_public_base_url.hostname else ""
+    if not request_host:
+        return False
+
+    def _matches(candidate: str) -> bool:
+        return candidate == configured_domain or candidate.endswith(f".{configured_domain}")
+
+    return _matches(origin_host) and _matches(request_host)
+
+
+def _resolve_cookie_samesite(request: Request, secure_cookie: bool) -> str:
+    """Returns cookie SameSite mode with same-site subdomain compatibility defaults."""
+
+    configured_mode = get_settings().auth_cookie_samesite.strip().lower()
+    if configured_mode in {"strict", "lax"}:
+        return configured_mode
+    if configured_mode == "none":
+        return "lax" if _request_matches_cookie_domain(request) else "none"
+    return "none" if secure_cookie else "lax"
 
 
 def _session_cookie_ttl_seconds(expires_at: datetime) -> int:
@@ -79,27 +144,39 @@ def _session_cookie_ttl_seconds(expires_at: datetime) -> int:
     return max(1, ttl)
 
 
-def _set_session_cookie(response: Response, session_token: str, *, expires_at: datetime, secure: bool) -> None:
+def _set_session_cookie(
+    response: Response,
+    session_token: str,
+    *,
+    request: Request,
+    expires_at: datetime,
+    secure: bool,
+) -> None:
     """Stores the issued session token in a browser HttpOnly auth cookie."""
 
     if response is None or not hasattr(response, "set_cookie"):
         return
     expires_seconds = _session_cookie_ttl_seconds(expires_at)
-    response.set_cookie(
-        SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
-        value=session_token,
-        max_age=expires_seconds,
-        httponly=True,
-        secure=secure,
-        samesite="strict",
-        path="/",
-    )
+    same_site_mode = _resolve_cookie_samesite(request, secure)
+    for cookie_domain in _resolve_cookie_domains():
+        cookie_kwargs = {
+            "value": session_token,
+            "max_age": expires_seconds,
+            "httponly": True,
+            "secure": secure,
+            "samesite": same_site_mode,
+            "path": "/",
+        }
+        if cookie_domain is not None:
+            cookie_kwargs["domain"] = cookie_domain
+        response.set_cookie(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, **cookie_kwargs)
 
 
 def _set_csrf_cookie(
     response: Response,
     csrf_token: str,
     *,
+    request: Request,
     expires_at: datetime,
     secure: bool,
 ) -> None:
@@ -107,15 +184,19 @@ def _set_csrf_cookie(
 
     if response is None or not hasattr(response, "set_cookie"):
         return
-    response.set_cookie(
-        CSRF_COOKIE_NAME,
-        value=csrf_token,
-        max_age=_session_cookie_ttl_seconds(expires_at),
-        httponly=False,
-        secure=secure,
-        samesite="strict",
-        path="/",
-    )
+    same_site_mode = _resolve_cookie_samesite(request, secure)
+    for cookie_domain in _resolve_cookie_domains():
+        cookie_kwargs = {
+            "value": csrf_token,
+            "max_age": _session_cookie_ttl_seconds(expires_at),
+            "httponly": False,
+            "secure": secure,
+            "samesite": same_site_mode,
+            "path": "/",
+        }
+        if cookie_domain is not None:
+            cookie_kwargs["domain"] = cookie_domain
+        response.set_cookie(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, **cookie_kwargs)
 
 
 def _clear_session_cookies(response: Response) -> None:
@@ -123,8 +204,12 @@ def _clear_session_cookies(response: Response) -> None:
 
     if response is None or not hasattr(response, "delete_cookie"):
         return
-    response.delete_cookie(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
-    response.delete_cookie(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
+    for cookie_domain in _resolve_cookie_domains():
+        delete_kwargs = {"path": "/"}
+        if cookie_domain is not None:
+            delete_kwargs["domain"] = cookie_domain
+        response.delete_cookie(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, **delete_kwargs)
+        response.delete_cookie(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, **delete_kwargs)
 
 
 @router.post("/login", response_model=AuthLoginResponse)
@@ -206,12 +291,14 @@ def login(
     _set_session_cookie(
         response,
         issued_session.token,
+        request=request,
         expires_at=issued_session.expires_at,
         secure=secure_cookie,
     )
     _set_csrf_cookie(
         response,
         csrf_token,
+        request=request,
         expires_at=issued_session.expires_at,
         secure=secure_cookie,
     )
@@ -225,9 +312,13 @@ def login(
 
 
 @router.get("/me", response_model=AuthSessionResponse)
-def me(context: AuthContext = Depends(require_user_or_admin)) -> AuthSessionResponse:
+def me(
+    context: AuthContext = Depends(require_user_or_admin),
+    csrf_cookie: str | None = Cookie(None, alias=CSRF_COOKIE_NAME),
+) -> AuthSessionResponse:
     """Returns current authenticated session identity and expiration metadata."""
 
+    normalized_csrf_cookie = (csrf_cookie or "").strip() or None
     return AuthSessionResponse(
         expires_at=context.expires_at,
         user=AuthUserResponse(
@@ -235,6 +326,7 @@ def me(context: AuthContext = Depends(require_user_or_admin)) -> AuthSessionResp
             username=context.username,
             role=context.role,
         ),
+        csrf_token=normalized_csrf_cookie,
     )
 
 

backend/app/core/config.py

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     auth_login_failure_window_seconds: int = 900
     auth_login_lockout_base_seconds: int = 30
     auth_login_lockout_max_seconds: int = 900
+    auth_cookie_domain: str = ""
+    auth_cookie_samesite: str = "auto"
     storage_root: Path = Path("/data/storage")
     upload_chunk_size: int = 4 * 1024 * 1024
     max_upload_files_per_request: int = 50

backend/app/schemas/auth.py

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ class AuthSessionResponse(BaseModel):
 
     user: AuthUserResponse
     expires_at: datetime
+    csrf_token: str | None = None
 
 
 class AuthLoginResponse(AuthSessionResponse):

backend/tests/test_security_controls.py

@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ if "app.services.routing_pipeline" not in sys.modules:
 from fastapi import HTTPException
 
 from app.api.auth import AuthContext, require_admin
+from app.api import auth as auth_dependency_module
 from app.api import routes_auth as auth_routes_module
 from app.api import routes_documents as documents_routes_module
 from app.core import config as config_module
@@ -420,6 +421,96 @@ class AuthDependencyTests(unittest.TestCase):
         resolved = require_admin(context=auth_context)
         self.assertEqual(resolved.role, UserRole.ADMIN)
 
+    def test_csrf_validation_accepts_matching_token_among_duplicate_cookie_values(self) -> None:
+        """PATCH CSRF validation accepts header token matching any duplicate csrf cookie value."""
+
+        request = SimpleNamespace(
+            method="PATCH",
+            headers={"cookie": "dcm_session=session-token; dcm_csrf=stale-token; dcm_csrf=fresh-token"},
+        )
+        resolved_session = SimpleNamespace(
+            id=uuid.uuid4(),
+            expires_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+            user=SimpleNamespace(
+                id=uuid.uuid4(),
+                username="admin",
+                role=UserRole.ADMIN,
+            ),
+        )
+        with patch.object(auth_dependency_module, "resolve_auth_session", return_value=resolved_session):
+            context = auth_dependency_module.get_request_auth_context(
+                request=request,
+                credentials=None,
+                csrf_header="fresh-token",
+                csrf_cookie="stale-token",
+                session_cookie="session-token",
+                session=SimpleNamespace(),
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(context.username, "admin")
+        self.assertEqual(context.role, UserRole.ADMIN)
+
+    def test_csrf_validation_rejects_when_header_does_not_match_any_cookie_value(self) -> None:
+        """PATCH CSRF validation rejects requests when header token matches no csrf cookie values."""
+
+        request = SimpleNamespace(
+            method="PATCH",
+            headers={"cookie": "dcm_session=session-token; dcm_csrf=stale-token; dcm_csrf=fresh-token"},
+        )
+        resolved_session = SimpleNamespace(
+            id=uuid.uuid4(),
+            expires_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+            user=SimpleNamespace(
+                id=uuid.uuid4(),
+                username="admin",
+                role=UserRole.ADMIN,
+            ),
+        )
+        with patch.object(auth_dependency_module, "resolve_auth_session", return_value=resolved_session):
+            with self.assertRaises(HTTPException) as raised:
+                auth_dependency_module.get_request_auth_context(
+                    request=request,
+                    credentials=None,
+                    csrf_header="unknown-token",
+                    csrf_cookie="stale-token",
+                    session_cookie="session-token",
+                    session=SimpleNamespace(),
+                )
+        self.assertEqual(raised.exception.status_code, 403)
+        self.assertEqual(raised.exception.detail, "Invalid CSRF token")
+
+    def test_cookie_auth_accepts_matching_session_among_duplicate_cookie_values(self) -> None:
+        """Cookie auth accepts the first valid session token among duplicate cookie values."""
+
+        request = SimpleNamespace(
+            method="GET",
+            headers={"cookie": "dcm_session=stale-token; dcm_session=fresh-token"},
+        )
+        resolved_session = SimpleNamespace(
+            id=uuid.uuid4(),
+            expires_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+            user=SimpleNamespace(
+                id=uuid.uuid4(),
+                username="admin",
+                role=UserRole.ADMIN,
+            ),
+        )
+        with patch.object(
+            auth_dependency_module,
+            "resolve_auth_session",
+            side_effect=[None, resolved_session],
+        ) as resolve_mock:
+            context = auth_dependency_module.get_request_auth_context(
+                request=request,
+                credentials=None,
+                csrf_header=None,
+                csrf_cookie=None,
+                session_cookie="stale-token",
+                session=SimpleNamespace(),
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(context.username, "admin")
+        self.assertEqual(context.role, UserRole.ADMIN)
+        self.assertEqual(resolve_mock.call_count, 2)
+
 
 class DocumentCatalogVisibilityTests(unittest.TestCase):
     """Verifies predefined tag and path discovery visibility by caller role."""
@@ -784,22 +875,44 @@ class AuthLoginRouteThrottleTests(unittest.TestCase):
 
             self.commit_count += 1
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _response_stub() -> SimpleNamespace:
+    class _ResponseStub:
+        """Captures response cookie calls for direct route invocation tests."""
+
+        def __init__(self) -> None:
+            self.set_cookie_calls: list[tuple[tuple[object, ...], dict[str, object]]] = []
+            self.delete_cookie_calls: list[tuple[tuple[object, ...], dict[str, object]]] = []
+
+        def set_cookie(self, *args: object, **kwargs: object) -> None:
+            """Records one set-cookie call."""
+
+            self.set_cookie_calls.append((args, kwargs))
+
+        def delete_cookie(self, *args: object, **kwargs: object) -> None:
+            """Records one delete-cookie call."""
+
+            self.delete_cookie_calls.append((args, kwargs))
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _response_stub(cls) -> "AuthLoginRouteThrottleTests._ResponseStub":
         """Builds a minimal response object for direct route invocation."""
 
-        return SimpleNamespace(
-            set_cookie=lambda *_args, **_kwargs: None,
-            delete_cookie=lambda *_args, **_kwargs: None,
-        )
+        return cls._ResponseStub()
 
     @staticmethod
-    def _request_stub(ip_address: str = "203.0.113.2", user_agent: str = "unit-test") -> SimpleNamespace:
+    def _request_stub(
+        ip_address: str = "203.0.113.2",
+        user_agent: str = "unit-test",
+        origin: str | None = None,
+    ) -> SimpleNamespace:
         """Builds request-like object containing client host and user-agent header fields."""
 
+        headers = {"user-agent": user_agent}
+        if origin:
+            headers["origin"] = origin
         return SimpleNamespace(
             client=SimpleNamespace(host=ip_address),
-            headers={"user-agent": user_agent},
+            headers=headers,
+            url=SimpleNamespace(hostname="api.docs.lan"),
         )
 
     def test_login_rejects_when_precheck_reports_active_throttle(self) -> None:
@@ -912,6 +1025,57 @@ class AuthLoginRouteThrottleTests(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(raised.exception.detail, auth_routes_module.LOGIN_RATE_LIMITER_UNAVAILABLE_DETAIL)
         self.assertEqual(session.commit_count, 0)
 
+    def test_login_sets_host_only_and_parent_domain_cookie_variants(self) -> None:
+        """Successful login sets a host-only cookie and an optional parent-domain mirror."""
+
+        payload = auth_routes_module.AuthLoginRequest(username="admin", password="correct-password")
+        session = self._SessionStub()
+        response_stub = self._response_stub()
+        fake_user = SimpleNamespace(
+            id=uuid.uuid4(),
+            username="admin",
+            role=UserRole.ADMIN,
+        )
+        fake_session = SimpleNamespace(
+            token="session-token",
+            expires_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+        )
+        fake_settings = SimpleNamespace(
+            auth_cookie_domain="docs.lan",
+            auth_cookie_samesite="none",
+            public_base_url="https://api.docs.lan",
+        )
+        with (
+            patch.object(
+                auth_routes_module,
+                "check_login_throttle",
+                return_value=auth_login_throttle_module.LoginThrottleStatus(
+                    is_throttled=False,
+                    retry_after_seconds=0,
+                ),
+            ),
+            patch.object(auth_routes_module, "authenticate_user", return_value=fake_user),
+            patch.object(auth_routes_module, "clear_login_throttle"),
+            patch.object(auth_routes_module, "issue_user_session", return_value=fake_session),
+            patch.object(auth_routes_module, "get_settings", return_value=fake_settings),
+            patch.object(auth_routes_module.secrets, "token_urlsafe", return_value="csrf-token"),
+        ):
+            auth_routes_module.login(
+                payload=payload,
+                request=self._request_stub(origin="https://docs.lan"),
+                response=response_stub,
+                session=session,
+            )
+
+        session_cookie_calls = [call for call in response_stub.set_cookie_calls if call[0][0] == auth_routes_module.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME]
+        csrf_cookie_calls = [call for call in response_stub.set_cookie_calls if call[0][0] == auth_routes_module.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME]
+        self.assertEqual(len(session_cookie_calls), 2)
+        self.assertEqual(len(csrf_cookie_calls), 2)
+        self.assertFalse(any("domain" in kwargs and kwargs["domain"] is None for _args, kwargs in session_cookie_calls))
+        self.assertIn("domain", session_cookie_calls[1][1])
+        self.assertEqual(session_cookie_calls[1][1]["domain"], "docs.lan")
+        self.assertEqual(session_cookie_calls[0][1]["samesite"], "lax")
+
 
 class ProviderBaseUrlValidationTests(unittest.TestCase):
     """Verifies allowlist, scheme, and private-network SSRF protections."""

doc/README.md

@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ This directory contains technical documentation for DMS.
 - `architecture-overview.md` - backend, frontend, and infrastructure architecture
 - `api-contract.md` - API endpoint contract grouped by route module, including session auth, login throttle responses, role and ownership scope, upload limits, and settings or processing-log security constraints
 - `data-model-reference.md` - database entity definitions and lifecycle states
-- `operations-and-configuration.md` - runtime operations, hardened compose defaults, DEV and LIVE security values, and persisted settings configuration behavior
+- `operations-and-configuration.md` - runtime operations, hardened compose defaults, DEV and LIVE security values, persisted settings configuration behavior, and frontend Vite host allowlist controls
 - `frontend-design-foundation.md` - frontend visual system, tokens, UI implementation rules, authenticated media delivery under session auth, processing-log timeline behavior, and settings helper-copy guidance
 - `../.env.example` - repository-level environment template with local defaults and production override guidance

doc/api-contract.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Primary implementation modules:
 - Login brute-force protection enforces Redis-backed throttle checks keyed by username and source IP.
 - State-changing requests from browser clients must send `x-csrf-token: <dcm_csrf>` in request headers (double-submit pattern).
 - For non-browser API clients, the optional `Authorization: Bearer <token>` path remains supported when the token is sent explicitly.
-- `GET /auth/me` returns current identity and role.
+- `GET /auth/me` returns current identity, role, and current CSRF token.
 - `POST /auth/logout` revokes current session token.
 
 Role matrix:

doc/operations-and-configuration.md

@@ -10,16 +10,17 @@
 - `worker` (RQ worker via `python -m app.worker.run_worker`)
 - `frontend` (Vite React UI)
 
-Persistent volumes:
-- `db-data`
-- `redis-data`
-- `dcm-storage`
-- `typesense-data`
+Persistent host bind mounts (default root `./data`, overridable with `DCM_DATA_DIR`):
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/db-data`
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/redis-data`
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage`
+- `${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/typesense-data`
 
 Reset all persisted runtime data:
 
 ```bash
-docker compose down -v
+docker compose down
+rm -rf ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}
 ```
 
 ## Core Commands
@@ -42,6 +43,26 @@ Tail logs:
 docker compose logs -f
 ```
 
+## Host Bind Mounts
+
+Compose is configured with host bind mounts for persistent data. Ensure host directories exist and are writable by the backend runtime user.
+
+Backend and worker run as non-root user `uid=10001` inside containers. Compose bootstraps the storage bind mount through the one-shot `storage-init` service before either process starts. For manual inspection or repair of host-mounted storage paths:
+
+```bash
+mkdir -p ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage
+sudo chown -R 10001:10001 ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage
+sudo chmod -R u+rwX,g+rwX ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage
+```
+
+If permissions are incorrect, API startup fails with errors similar to:
+- `PermissionError: [Errno 13] Permission denied: '/data/storage'`
+- `FileNotFoundError` for `/data/storage/originals`
+
+## Frontend Build Baseline
+
+The frontend Dockerfile uses `node:22-slim` with a standard `npm ci --no-audit` install step and no npm-specific build tuning flags.
+
 ## Authentication Model
 
 - Legacy shared build-time frontend token behavior was removed.
@@ -66,8 +87,9 @@ Use `.env.example` as baseline. The table below documents user-managed settings
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | `APP_ENV` | `development` | `production` |
 | `HOST_BIND_IP` | `127.0.0.1` or local LAN bind if needed | `127.0.0.1` (publish behind proxy only) |
-| `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` | `http://localhost:8000` | `https://api.example.com` |
-| `VITE_API_BASE` | empty for host-derived `http://<frontend-host>:8000/api/v1`, or explicit local URL | `https://api.example.com/api/v1` |
+| `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` | `http://localhost:8000` or same-origin frontend host when proxying API through frontend | `https://app.example.com` when frontend proxies `/api`, or dedicated API origin if you intentionally keep split-origin routing |
+| `VITE_API_BASE` | empty to use same-origin `/api/v1` through frontend proxy, or explicit local URL when bypassing proxy | empty or `/api/v1` for same-origin production routing; only use `https://api.example.com/api/v1` when you intentionally keep split-origin frontend/API traffic |
+| `VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS` | optional comma-separated hostnames, for example `localhost,docs.lan` | optional comma-separated public frontend hostnames, for example `app.example.com` |
 | `CORS_ORIGINS` | `["http://localhost:5173","http://localhost:3000"]` | exact frontend origins only, for example `["https://app.example.com"]` |
 | `REDIS_URL` | `redis://:<password>@redis:6379/0` in isolated local network | `rediss://:<password>@redis.internal:6379/0` |
 | `REDIS_SECURITY_MODE` | `compat` or `auto` | `strict` |
@@ -76,6 +98,8 @@ Use `.env.example` as baseline. The table below documents user-managed settings
 | `AUTH_LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW_SECONDS` | default `900` | tune to identity-protection policy and support requirements |
 | `AUTH_LOGIN_LOCKOUT_BASE_SECONDS` | default `30` | tune to identity-protection policy and support requirements |
 | `AUTH_LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MAX_SECONDS` | default `900` | tune to identity-protection policy and support requirements |
+| `AUTH_COOKIE_DOMAIN` | empty (recommended; API always issues a host-only auth cookie) | optional parent domain only when you explicitly need a mirrored domain cookie, for example `docs.lan` |
+| `AUTH_COOKIE_SAMESITE` | `auto` | `none` only for truly cross-site frontend/API deployments; keep `auto` for same-site subdomains such as `docs.lan` and `api.docs.lan` |
 | `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_HTTP` | `true` only when intentionally testing local HTTP provider endpoints | `false` |
 | `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK` | `true` only for trusted local development targets | `false` |
 | `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOWLIST` | allow needed test hosts | explicit production allowlist, for example `["api.openai.com"]` |
@@ -119,6 +143,18 @@ Recommended LIVE pattern:
 ## Frontend Runtime
 
 - Frontend no longer consumes `VITE_API_TOKEN`.
+- Frontend image target is environment-driven:
+  - `APP_ENV=development` builds the `development` target and runs Vite dev server
+  - `APP_ENV=production` builds the `production` target and serves static assets through unprivileged Nginx
+- Frontend Docker targets are selected from `APP_ENV`, so use `development` or `production` values.
+- Production frontend Nginx uses non-root runtime plus `/tmp` temp-path configuration so it can run with container capability dropping enabled.
+- Vite dev server host allowlist uses the union of:
+  - hostnames extracted from `CORS_ORIGINS`
+  - optional explicit hostnames from `VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS`
+- `VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS` only affects development mode where Vite is running.
+- API auth cookies support optional domain and SameSite configuration through `AUTH_COOKIE_DOMAIN` and `AUTH_COOKIE_SAMESITE`.
+- HTTPS cookie security detection falls back to `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` scheme when proxy headers are missing.
+- CSRF validation accepts header matches against any `dcm_csrf` cookie value in the request, covering stale plus fresh duplicate-cookie transitions.
 - Session authentication is cookie-based; browser reloads and new tabs can reuse an active session until it expires or is revoked.
 - Protected media and file download flows still use authenticated fetch plus blob/object URL handling.
 

docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,19 @@
 services:
+  storage-init:
+    build:
+      context: ./backend
+    user: "0:0"
+    command:
+      - "sh"
+      - "-c"
+      - >
+        mkdir -p /data/storage/originals /data/storage/derived/previews /data/storage/tmp &&
+        chown -R 10001:10001 /data/storage &&
+        chmod -R u+rwX,g+rwX /data/storage
+    volumes:
+      - ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage:/data/storage
+    restart: "no"
+
   db:
     image: postgres:16-alpine
     environment:
@@ -6,12 +21,15 @@ services:
       POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?POSTGRES_PASSWORD must be set}
       POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB:?POSTGRES_DB must be set}
     volumes:
-      - db-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
+      - ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/db-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
     healthcheck:
       test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER:?POSTGRES_USER must be set} -d ${POSTGRES_DB:?POSTGRES_DB must be set}"]
       interval: 10s
       timeout: 5s
       retries: 10
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks:
+      - internal
 
   redis:
     image: redis:7-alpine
@@ -22,16 +40,21 @@ services:
       - "--requirepass"
       - "${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set}"
     volumes:
-      - redis-data:/data
+      - ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/redis-data:/data
+    networks:
+      - internal
 
   typesense:
-    image: typesense/typesense:29.0
+    image: typesense/typesense:30.2.rc6
     command:
       - "--data-dir=/data"
       - "--api-key=${TYPESENSE_API_KEY:?TYPESENSE_API_KEY must be set}"
       - "--enable-cors"
     volumes:
-      - typesense-data:/data
+      - ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/typesense-data:/data
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks:
+      - internal
 
   api:
     build:
@@ -68,22 +91,29 @@ services:
       TYPESENSE_PORT: 8108
       TYPESENSE_API_KEY: ${TYPESENSE_API_KEY:?TYPESENSE_API_KEY must be set}
       TYPESENSE_COLLECTION_NAME: documents
-    ports:
-      - "${HOST_BIND_IP:-127.0.0.1}:8000:8000"
+    # ports:
+    #   - "${HOST_BIND_IP:-127.0.0.1}:8000:8000"
     security_opt:
       - no-new-privileges:true
     cap_drop:
       - ALL
     volumes:
       - ./backend/app:/app/app
-      - dcm-storage:/data
+      - ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage:/data/storage
     depends_on:
       db:
         condition: service_healthy
       redis:
         condition: service_started
+      storage-init:
+        condition: service_completed_successfully
       typesense:
         condition: service_started
+    networks:
+      npm_proxy:
+        ipv4_address: 192.168.98.41
+      internal:
+    restart: unless-stopped
 
   worker:
     build:
@@ -111,7 +141,7 @@ services:
       TYPESENSE_COLLECTION_NAME: documents
     volumes:
       - ./backend/app:/app/app
-      - dcm-storage:/data
+      - ${DCM_DATA_DIR:-./data}/storage:/data/storage
     security_opt:
       - no-new-privileges:true
     cap_drop:
@@ -121,16 +151,27 @@ services:
         condition: service_healthy
       redis:
         condition: service_started
+      storage-init:
+        condition: service_completed_successfully
       typesense:
         condition: service_started
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    networks:
+      - internal
 
   frontend:
     build:
       context: ./frontend
+      target: ${APP_ENV:-development}
+      args:
+        VITE_API_BASE: ${VITE_API_BASE:-}
     environment:
       VITE_API_BASE: ${VITE_API_BASE:-}
-    ports:
-      - "${HOST_BIND_IP:-127.0.0.1}:5173:5173"
+      VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET: ${VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET:-http://api:8000}
+      CORS_ORIGINS: '${CORS_ORIGINS:-["http://localhost:5173","http://localhost:3000"]}'
+      VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS: ${VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS:-}
+    # ports:
+    #   - "${HOST_BIND_IP:-127.0.0.1}:5173:5173"
     volumes:
       - ./frontend/src:/app/src
       - ./frontend/index.html:/app/index.html
@@ -142,9 +183,14 @@ services:
       - no-new-privileges:true
     cap_drop:
       - ALL
+    networks:
+      npm_proxy:
+        ipv4_address: 192.168.98.40
+      internal:
+    restart: unless-stopped
 
-volumes:
-  db-data:
-  redis-data:
-  dcm-storage:
-  typesense-data:
+networks:
+  internal:
+    driver: bridge
+  npm_proxy:
+    external: true

frontend/Dockerfile

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-FROM node:22-alpine
+FROM node:20-slim AS base
 
 WORKDIR /app
 
 COPY package.json /app/package.json
 COPY package-lock.json /app/package-lock.json
-RUN npm ci
-RUN chown -R node:node /app
+RUN npm ci --no-audit \
+    && chown -R node:node /app
 
 COPY --chown=node:node tsconfig.json /app/tsconfig.json
 COPY --chown=node:node tsconfig.node.json /app/tsconfig.node.json
@@ -13,8 +13,32 @@ COPY --chown=node:node vite.config.ts /app/vite.config.ts
 COPY --chown=node:node index.html /app/index.html
 COPY --chown=node:node src /app/src
 
+FROM base AS development
+
 EXPOSE 5173
 
 USER node
 
 CMD ["npm", "run", "dev", "--", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "5173"]
+
+FROM base AS build
+
+ARG VITE_API_BASE=
+ENV VITE_API_BASE=${VITE_API_BASE}
+
+RUN npm run build
+
+FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS production
+
+COPY nginx-main.conf /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
+COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
+COPY --from=build /app/dist /usr/share/nginx/html
+RUN mkdir -p /tmp/client_temp /tmp/proxy_temp /tmp/fastcgi_temp /tmp/uwsgi_temp /tmp/scgi_temp \
+    && chown -R 101:101 /tmp /var/log/nginx /usr/share/nginx/html
+
+EXPOSE 5173
+
+USER 101:101
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["nginx"]
+CMD ["-g", "daemon off;"]

frontend/nginx-main.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+worker_processes auto;
+pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
+
+events {
+    worker_connections 1024;
+}
+
+http {
+    include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
+    default_type application/octet-stream;
+
+    sendfile on;
+    keepalive_timeout 65;
+
+    client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
+    proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
+    fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
+    uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
+    scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
+
+    include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf;
+}

frontend/nginx.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+server {
+    listen 5173;
+    listen [::]:5173;
+    server_name _;
+    client_max_body_size 100m;
+
+    root /usr/share/nginx/html;
+    index index.html;
+
+    location /api/ {
+        proxy_pass http://api:8000;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+    }
+
+    location / {
+        try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
+    }
+}

frontend/src/lib/api.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import type {
 } from '../types';
 
 /**
- * Resolves backend base URL from environment with host-derived HTTP fallback.
+ * Resolves backend base URL from environment with same-origin proxy fallback.
  */
 function resolveApiBase(): string {
   const envValue = import.meta.env?.VITE_API_BASE;
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ function resolveApiBase(): string {
     }
   }
 
-  if (typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.location?.hostname) {
-    return `${window.location.protocol}//${window.location.hostname}:8000/api/v1`;
+  if (typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.location?.origin) {
+    return '/api/v1';
   }
   return 'http://localhost:8000/api/v1';
 }
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ const API_BASE = resolveApiBase();
 const CSRF_COOKIE_NAME = "dcm_csrf";
 const CSRF_HEADER_NAME = "x-csrf-token";
 const CSRF_SAFE_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]);
+const CSRF_SESSION_STORAGE_KEY = "dcm_csrf_token";
 
 type ApiRequestInit = Omit<RequestInit, 'headers'> & { headers?: HeadersInit };
 
@@ -65,7 +66,38 @@ function getCookieValue(name: string): string | undefined {
  * Resolves the runtime CSRF token from browser cookie storage for API requests.
  */
 function resolveCsrfToken(): string | undefined {
-  return getCookieValue(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME);
+  const cookieToken = getCookieValue(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME);
+  if (cookieToken) {
+    return cookieToken;
+  }
+  return loadStoredCsrfToken();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Loads the runtime CSRF token from browser session storage.
+ */
+function loadStoredCsrfToken(): string | undefined {
+  if (typeof window === "undefined") {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const rawValue = window.sessionStorage.getItem(CSRF_SESSION_STORAGE_KEY);
+  const normalizedValue = rawValue?.trim();
+  return normalizedValue ? normalizedValue : undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Persists or clears a runtime CSRF token in browser session storage.
+ */
+function persistCsrfToken(token: string | undefined | null): void {
+  if (typeof window === "undefined") {
+    return;
+  }
+  const normalizedValue = typeof token === "string" ? token.trim() : "";
+  if (!normalizedValue) {
+    window.sessionStorage.removeItem(CSRF_SESSION_STORAGE_KEY);
+    return;
+  }
+  window.sessionStorage.setItem(CSRF_SESSION_STORAGE_KEY, normalizedValue);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -181,7 +213,9 @@ export async function loginWithPassword(username: string, password: string): Pro
     }
     throw new Error('Login failed');
   }
-  return response.json() as Promise<AuthLoginResponse>;
+  const payload = await (response.json() as Promise<AuthLoginResponse>);
+  persistCsrfToken(payload.csrf_token);
+  return payload;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -196,7 +230,9 @@ export async function getCurrentAuthSession(): Promise<AuthSessionInfo> {
     }
     throw new Error('Failed to load authentication session');
   }
-  return response.json() as Promise<AuthSessionInfo>;
+  const payload = await (response.json() as Promise<AuthSessionInfo>);
+  persistCsrfToken(payload.csrf_token);
+  return payload;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -206,6 +242,7 @@ export async function logoutCurrentSession(): Promise<void> {
   const response = await apiRequest(`${API_BASE}/auth/logout`, {
     method: 'POST',
   });
+  persistCsrfToken(undefined);
   if (!response.ok && response.status !== 401) {
     const detail = await responseErrorDetail(response);
     if (detail) {

frontend/src/types.ts

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ export interface AuthUser {
 export interface AuthSessionInfo {
   user: AuthUser;
   expires_at: string;
+  csrf_token?: string;
 }
 
 /**

frontend/vite.config.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,93 @@
 /**
  * Vite configuration for the DMS frontend application.
  */
-import { defineConfig } from 'vite';
+import { defineConfig, loadEnv } from 'vite';
+
+/**
+ * Parses a comma-separated environment value into normalized entries.
+ *
+ * @param rawValue Raw comma-separated value.
+ * @returns List of non-empty normalized entries.
+ */
+function parseCsvList(rawValue: string | undefined): string[] {
+  if (!rawValue) {
+    return [];
+  }
+
+  return rawValue
+    .split(',')
+    .map((entry) => entry.trim())
+    .filter((entry) => entry.length > 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extracts hostnames from CORS origin values.
+ *
+ * @param rawValue JSON array string or comma-separated origin list.
+ * @returns Hostnames parsed from valid origins.
+ */
+function parseCorsOriginHosts(rawValue: string | undefined): string[] {
+  if (!rawValue) {
+    return [];
+  }
+
+  let origins: string[] = [];
+
+  try {
+    const parsedOrigins = JSON.parse(rawValue);
+    if (Array.isArray(parsedOrigins)) {
+      origins = parsedOrigins.filter((entry): entry is string => typeof entry === 'string');
+    } else if (typeof parsedOrigins === 'string') {
+      origins = [parsedOrigins];
+    }
+  } catch {
+    origins = parseCsvList(rawValue);
+  }
+
+  return origins.flatMap((origin) => {
+    try {
+      const parsedUrl = new URL(origin);
+      return parsedUrl.hostname ? [parsedUrl.hostname] : [];
+    } catch {
+      return [];
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds the Vite allowed host list from environment-driven inputs.
+ *
+ * @param env Environment variable key-value map.
+ * @returns De-duplicated hostnames, or undefined to keep Vite defaults.
+ */
+function buildAllowedHosts(env: Record<string, string>): string[] | undefined {
+  const explicitHosts = parseCsvList(env.VITE_ALLOWED_HOSTS);
+  const corsOriginHosts = parseCorsOriginHosts(env.CORS_ORIGINS);
+  const mergedHosts = Array.from(new Set([...explicitHosts, ...corsOriginHosts]));
+
+  return mergedHosts.length > 0 ? mergedHosts : undefined;
+}
 
 /**
  * Exports frontend build and dev-server settings.
  */
-export default defineConfig({
+export default defineConfig(({ mode }) => {
+  const env = loadEnv(mode, process.cwd(), '');
+  const allowedHosts = buildAllowedHosts(env);
+  const apiProxyTarget = env.VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET?.trim() || 'http://localhost:8000';
+
+  return {
     server: {
       host: '0.0.0.0',
       port: 5173,
+      proxy: {
+        '/api': {
+          target: apiProxyTarget,
+          changeOrigin: false,
+          secure: false,
         },
+      },
+      ...(allowedHosts ? { allowedHosts } : {}),
+    },
+  };
 });