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Fix predefined catalog visibility and port security must-know guidance

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Beda Schmid
2026-03-01 21:15:12 -03:00
parent 32b4589b28
commit 874597e40b
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README.md
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@@ -75,34 +75,69 @@ docker compose down
## Security Must-Know Before Real User Deployment
This repository starts in a development-friendly mode. Before exposing it to real users or untrusted networks, verify these controls:
The items below port the `MUST KNOW User-Dependent Risks` from `REPORT.md` into explicit operator actions.
1. Environment mode and host binding:
### High: Development-first defaults can be promoted to production
Avoid:
- Set `APP_ENV=production`.
- Keep `HOST_BIND_IP=127.0.0.1` and publish through an HTTPS reverse proxy instead of broad host bind.
- Set `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_HTTP=false`.
- Set `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=false`.
- Set a strict non-empty `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOWLIST` for approved provider hosts only.
- Set `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` to HTTPS.
- Restrict `CORS_ORIGINS` to exact production frontend origins.
- Use `REDIS_URL` with `rediss://`.
- Set `REDIS_SECURITY_MODE=strict`.
- Set `REDIS_TLS_MODE=required`.
- Keep `HOST_BIND_IP=127.0.0.1` and expose services only through an HTTPS reverse proxy.
2. Bootstrap credentials:
- Replace all `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_*` values with strong unique passwords before first public deployment.
- Disable optional bootstrap user credentials unless they are needed.
Remedy:
- Immediately correct the values above and redeploy `api` and `worker` (`docker compose up -d api worker`).
- Rotate `AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_*` credentials, provider API keys, and Redis credentials if insecure values were used in a reachable environment.
- Re-check `.env.example` and `docker-compose.yml` before each production promotion.
3. Processing log text persistence:
- Keep `PROCESSING_LOG_STORE_MODEL_IO_TEXT=false` and `PROCESSING_LOG_STORE_PAYLOAD_TEXT=false` unless temporary debugging is required.
- Enabling these values can store sensitive prompt, response, and payload text.
### Medium: Login throttle IP identity depends on proxy trust model
4. Provider outbound restrictions:
- Keep `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_HTTP=false` and `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=false`.
- Set a strict `PROVIDER_BASE_URL_ALLOWLIST` containing only approved provider hosts.
Current behavior:
- Login throttle identity currently uses `request.client.host` directly.
5. Public URL and CORS posture:
- Use HTTPS in `PUBLIC_BASE_URL`.
- Restrict `CORS_ORIGINS` to exact production frontend origins only.
Avoid:
- Deploy so the backend receives true client IP addresses and does not collapse all traffic to one proxy source IP.
- Validate lockout behavior with multiple client IPs before going live behind a proxy.
6. Redis transport security:
- For live deployments, use `REDIS_URL` with `rediss://`, set `REDIS_SECURITY_MODE=strict`, and set `REDIS_TLS_MODE=required`.
Remedy:
- If lockouts affect many users at once, temporarily increase `AUTH_LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT` and tune lockout timings to reduce impact while mitigation is in progress.
- Update network and proxy topology so client IP identity is preserved for the backend, then re-run lockout validation tests.
7. Development compose defaults:
- Review `.env.example` and `docker-compose.yml` security-related defaults before deployment.
- Do not promote development defaults unchanged into production.
### Medium: API documentation endpoints are exposed by default
Avoid:
- Block public access to `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` at the reverse proxy or edge firewall.
- Keep docs endpoints reachable only from trusted internal/admin networks.
Remedy:
- Add deny rules for those paths immediately and reload the proxy.
- Verify those routes return `403` or `404` from untrusted networks.
### Medium: Bearer token is stored in browser `sessionStorage`
Avoid:
- Enforce strict CSP and disallow inline script execution where possible.
- Avoid rendering untrusted HTML or script-capable content in the frontend.
- Keep dependencies patched to reduce known XSS vectors.
Remedy:
- If XSS is suspected, revoke active sessions, rotate privileged credentials, and redeploy frontend fixes before restoring user access.
- Treat exposed browser sessions as compromised until revocation and credential rotation are complete.
### Low: Typesense transport defaults to HTTP on internal network
Avoid:
- Keep Typesense on isolated internal networks only.
- Do not expose Typesense service ports directly to untrusted networks.
Remedy:
- For cross-host or untrusted network paths, terminate TLS in front of Typesense (or use equivalent secure service networking) and require encrypted transport for all clients.
## Common Operations