Fix auth session persistence with HttpOnly cookies and CSRF

This commit is contained in:
2026-03-01 21:39:22 -03:00
parent a9333ec973
commit 26eae1a09b
14 changed files with 255 additions and 108 deletions

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@@ -119,16 +119,17 @@ Remedy:
- Add deny rules for those paths immediately and reload the proxy.
- Verify those routes return `403` or `404` from untrusted networks.
### Medium: Bearer token is stored in browser `sessionStorage`
### Medium: Auth session tokens are cookie-based
Avoid:
- Enforce strict CSP and disallow inline script execution where possible.
- Avoid rendering untrusted HTML or script-capable content in the frontend.
- Keep dependencies patched to reduce known XSS vectors.
- Keep frontend dependencies locked and scanned for known payload paths.
- Treat any suspected script injection as a session risk and rotate bootstrap credentials immediately.
Remedy:
- If XSS is suspected, revoke active sessions, rotate privileged credentials, and redeploy frontend fixes before restoring user access.
- Treat exposed browser sessions as compromised until revocation and credential rotation are complete.
- If script injection is suspected, revoke active sessions, rotate bootstrap credentials, and redeploy frontend fixes before restoring access.
- Treat exposed sessions as compromised until revocation and credential rotation are complete.
- Cookies are HttpOnly and cannot be read by JavaScript, but session scope still ends on server-side revocation and expiry controls.
### Low: Typesense transport defaults to HTTP on internal network